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THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY AND ADDRESSING CLIMATE
CHANGE: A CANADIAN CASE*
David Gooderham †*
There are times when we must disobey the law. If we are lucky, we may
live our entire lives without being confronted by such a time. I don’t believe that, for most people, respect for the law derives from the threat of
punishment, even severe punishment. People respect and honour the law
because they trust and have confidence in its process. At its best, we have
confidence that the law has an extraordinary integrity and capacity to address the most complex and vexing conflicts—ones that often threaten the
most vulnerable, those who have little power or influence, or no power at
all.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I have been convicted of criminal contempt of court for acting to
halt the construction of the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion. I am not
alone; about 240 other people were arrested last year in British Columbia
for steps they took to oppose that project. On December 3, 2018, in a joint
application with my co-accused, Jennifer Nathan, we sought leave to raise
the common law defence of necessity at our trial, and for permission to
call expert evidence at trial about climate change and the emissions implications of continuing to expand Canada’s oil sands industry. After a twoday hearing, the presiding judge, Justice Affleck, dismissed our application. We were convicted at a further hearing on March 11, 2019. We have
launched an appeal of that decision to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia.1
One of the unusual features of this application is that we were not
permitted to call any actual evidence (i.e., sworn affidavits or oral testimony from leading climate scientists and energy economists). We were
only allowed to provide the court with an “outline”2 or written summary
of the evidence we proposed to call. Our application, presented to the
court on December 3–4, 2018, was therefore a preliminary application to
obtain the court’s “leave” or permission to call the needed scientific evidence at our trial.
I offer below some comments on the proposed evidence we have
presented to the B.C. court in this case. We show the failures of Canada’s
environmental review process for the Trans Mountain project. The process refused to address whether the planned expansion of oil sands production to 2040 could be consistent with Canada’s commitments under the
Paris Agreement to keep the increase in global warming to within the
1.5°C or 2°C limits.
My working life was as a lawyer in civil litigation for 35 years. I
retired from practice at the end of 2012. The benefit of that background
allowed me to see the enormous promise that the judicial process offers, if
it can be engaged, to bring this troubling evidence to an open public hearing. In our government, nobody wants to talk about the rapid pace of the

1.
Her Majesty the Queen v. David Anthony Gooderham and Jennifer
Nathan (Can. B.C. Court of Appeal, Nos. CA45950 & 45953). The Notice of Appeal
was filed March 11, 2019. Appellants’ factum was filed on November 18, 2020. The
hearing is set for May 26, 2020.
2.
Appellants’ Outline of Proposed Evid. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://dagooderham.com/legalaction/outline-of-proposed-evidence/.
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advancing climate peril. But to reveal the full gravity of our problem, there
is no better forum than the courts because people have to tell the truth.

II. CANADA’S EMISSIONS SITUATION3
In terms of its annual emissions, Canada is about one-ninth the
size of the United States––716 million tonnes (Mt) in 2017 compared to
6.4 billion tonnes, or roughly equivalent to one of the largest emitting
American states (i.e., California or Texas). Canada accounts for 1.6% of
annual global emissions—but is the world’s tenth largest emitter.
Proponents of oil sands expansion often say that Canada’s share
of global emissions is so small that anything we do is of no consequence.
Let us pause to consider the “smallness of Canada.” The point is that no
player is “small” in our current predicament. There are four big emitters:
China, the United States, Europe, and India. They account for about 60%
of annual global emissions. The world needs to achieve absolute reduction
in the range of 25% to 50% below current levels within the next 11 years
to stay within 1.5 or 2°C. That requires all countries worldwide on average to reduce their emissions by 25% to 50%. But the evidence is clear
that two of the world’s largest emitters, China and India, and also many of
the poorest countries, will achieve no absolute reductions at all below
their current levels before 2030.
So, there is no realistic hope of mitigating the impending dire outcome unless Canada and other wealthy, technologically advanced midsize economies achieve their own deep cuts over the next eleven years.
The dilemma for Canada is that it has a disproportionately large oil and
gas sector. Oil and gas is Canada’s largest emitting sector (26% of our
annual total)—whereas, in the United States and in most other advanced
economies, the largest emitting sector is transportation. Canada’s oil and

3.
See, e.g., Env’t & Climate Change Can., National Inventory Report
1990–2016: Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in Canada, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Apr. 13, 2018), https://unfccc.int/documents/65715;
Env’t & Climate Change Can., Canada’s 7th National Communication and 3rd Biennial Report, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Dec. 29, 2017),
https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/national_communications_and_biennial_reports/application/pdf/82051493_canada-nc7-br3-1-5108_eccc_can7thncomm3rdbireport_en_04_web.pdf; Env’t & Climate Change Can., Review of Related Upstream
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates, IMPACT ASSESSMENT AGENCY OF CAN. (Nov.
25, 2016), https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/documents/p80061/116524E.pdf; Alberta, Climate Leadership Plan Progress Report, ALBERTA GOV. (Dec. 2017), https://open.alberta.ca/dataset/854af86e-309a-4727-90f9-6bba947dc66e/resource/989797fb-b8904f52-9e91-43938fff566f/download/clp-progress-report-2016-17.pdf.
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gas sector is projected to show no decline in total emissions by 2030, below the present level (yes, some producers will achieve credible reductions
in emissions per barrel, but the number of barrels is rising). The expansion
of the oil sands accounts for virtually all of the growth in Canada’s oil and
gas sector emissions between 2005 and 2030.
Because of geography and the economics of transporting bitumen,
the projected expansion of oil sands production to 2030 and 2040 depends
on new pipeline capacity. It depends critically on two proposed new pipelines in Canada—Trans Mountain and a second new project, Line 3. The
proponents of further expansion also hope to see the early completion of
Keystone XL. That dependency on new pipelines is all the more acute
because the costs of production per barrel in Alberta are comparatively
high—and using rail adds about $10 per barrel more.
Canada is not on track to meet its reduction commitments by 2030
under the Paris Agreement, which promises a 30% cut below the 2005
level. Canada’s total emissions by 2020 are projected to be only about 2%
less than in 2005. In April 2019, the Government of Canada published its
most recent emissions data to 2017. The numbers show that in the period
from 2005 to 2017, Canada achieved a creditable 45 Mt reduction of annual emissions in our electricity sector (by far the largest source of emissions reductions in the country). But over the same period, from 2005 to
2017, the annual level of emission from the oil sands extraction increased
by 45 Mt—entirely cancelling out all gains from the transformation of
Canada’s electricity sector.
In our case, we are relying on the common law defence of necessity, which holds that in a situation where there is "a clear and imminent
peril," conduct disobeying the law undertaken by a citizen to avoid the
peril may be excused from criminal liability.4
At this preliminary application for leave to raise the necessity defence, we were not obliged to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that
there exists an “imminent peril.” The test we had to meet, in order to be
allowed to call the required evidence, was simply to demonstrate (based
on the material in our Outline of Proposed Evidence) that there is an air of
reality (a legal expression)5 to our belief that advancing climate change is
an imminent peril within the meaning of the law, and that our belief is
reasonable, based on the available objective evidence (set out in our summary of expert evidence of climate scientists and energy economists).

4.
Regina v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1, at ¶ 29 (quoting Morgentaler v. The
Queen, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 616, at p. 678); see Perka v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
232.
5.
See R. v. Osolin, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595, at 676.
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That test, an air of reality, is a relatively low threshold of
proof. To meet that test, the judge needed only to be satisfied that our case
about the impending threat of advancing climate change is not fanciful,
and that if the proposed scientific evidence set out in the Outline were to
be actually heard at trial—and assuming it is accepted as credible by the
trial judge—the trial judge could decide, based on that evidence, that our
belief we are facing an “imminent peril” is reasonable.

III. GLOBAL CONTEXT: PROPOSED EVIDENCE
The Outline shows that even if all countries in the world (including Canada) were to fully implement all the commitments they have already made under the Paris Agreement to reduce their own national emissions by 2030 (referred to as their Nationally Determined Contributions or
“NDCs”), the surface of the earth by 2030 will still be irrevocably committed to warming that will far exceed the promised 2°C threshold. The
UN Emissions Gap Report 2017, cited in the Outline, explains the importance of the next twelve years:
Looking beyond 2030, it is clear that if the emissions gap
is not closed by 2030, it is extremely unlikely that the goal
of keeping warming to well below 2°C can still be
reached. Even if the current NDCs are fully implemented,
the carbon budget for limiting global warming to below
2°C will be about 80% depleted by 2030. Given currently
available carbon budget estimates, the available carbon
budget for 1.5°C warming will already be well depleted
by 2030.6
The emissions “gap” is the difference between the currently projected
level of global emissions in 2030 (assuming that all existing NDCs are
fully implemented) and the much lower level of global emissions required
to keep warming “well below 2°C.” The UN report concludes that, at present, we are on a path to more than 3°C warming.
To stay below 2°C, the annual level of global emissions must decline from the currently projected 2030 level of 55.2 billion tonnes of
CO2eq (GtCO2eq) down to an annual level of 41.8 GtCO2eq or less—a

6.
Emissions Gap Report 2017, UN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME ixv,
https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2017 (Nov. 2017).
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reduction of 13.4 GtCO2eq—requiring cuts by all emitting countries averaging 25% worldwide. To stay below 1.5°C, the annual level of global
emissions must decline by about 50% below current levels by 2030.
There are no existing commitments by signatories to the Paris
Agreement to make additional reductions to their national emissions,
which might even partially close that gap. In its Fifth Assessment Report,
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that the only
pathways consistent with keeping warming below 2°C require emissions
reductions on a global scale starting by 2020.7 We have presented the
court with a summary of the most recent available evidence showing baseline (“business-as-usual”) projections of future emissions growth, looking
at the period to 2030. The available evidence shows that even if all signatories to the 2015 Paris Agreement fully implement all their promised
NDCs, the level of global emissions is projected to rise 6% above the 2016
level.
Oil accounts for 34% of global CO2 emissions from burning fossil
fuels. Although emissions from coal burning (40% of the total) are beginning to decline, coal demand increased by 1% in 2017. Emissions from
natural gas (19%) are increasing—and expected to continue to increase for
at least another decade. The “450 Scenario” published in the IEA’s World
Energy Outlook 2015 is based on a 50-50 chance of keeping warming below the 2°C threshold.8 It concludes that, to meet that goal, global oil
consumption would have to start to decline by 2020.
Notwithstanding the need to curb oil consumption starting in 2020
to meet the 2°C limit, the Appellants’ Outline shows that global oil consumption in all baseline studies is projected to continue increasing to
2040. The world’s six or seven major oil-producing countries, including
Canada, are intent on continuing to expand oil production to 2040 and, in
the case of Canada, are currently building new infrastructure to facilitate
that expansion.
The window of opportunity to close the emissions “gap” is brief
and unforgiving. Unprecedented cuts in the annual level of emissions
would have to start on a global scale by 2020 and be repeated every year
through the next decade. In the absence of deep cuts in the annual level of

7.
Fifth Assessment Report, IPCC, https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar5/ (2014); see also Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, IPCC, https://ar5syr.ipcc.ch (2015).
8.
World Energy Outlook 2015, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Nov. 10,
2015), https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2015.
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global emissions within that timeframe, by 2030 the atmospheric concentration level will have exceeded 450 parts per million (“ppm”) CO2eq,
which irrevocably commits us to warming above 2°C.
That is the proposed evidence we presented to the court.
The atmospheric carbon concentration reached 405 ppm in 2017.
It is now rising 20 ppm per decade. In recent years, the annual increase
has been higher—rising 3.0 ppm in 2016.
Further, the proposed evidence in our case shows that two of the
world’s four largest emitting economies are projected to contribute relatively little or nothing to future cuts to 2030. China, the world’s largest
emitter (28% of the global total), is expected to achieve no significant reduction in the annual level of its emissions before 2030. India’s emissions
(7% of the global total) will continue to grow to 2030. India’s emissions
are 1.8 tonnes of CO2 (tCO2) per person, compared to 16.6 tCO2 per person
for the USA and 7.2t CO2 for China. Very low per capita emissions reflect
severe poverty, leaving poorer countries no margin to further reduce their
total emissions. Any deep reductions of global emissions (cuts in the order
of 25% to 50% on a global average) will therefore have to come disproportionately from a smaller number of technologically advanced countries.
For that reason, emissions reductions in Canada are crucial.

IV. THE DECISION IN OUR CASE
At the conclusion of our hearing on December 4, 2018, the presiding judge rejected our application to call evidence on the emissions implications of the Trans Mountain expansion.9 In his reasons for judgment,
issued six weeks later, Justice Affleck found that there is a “contingency”
that any dire climate outcome can still be avoided:
On the evidence the applicants seek to offer, rising global
temperatures, to a level that is catastrophic to life, is a process that has been happening over many decades. Despite
a historical lack of initiative to curb emissions over these
same decades, adaptive societal measures may be taken to
prevent such a dire outcome. Whether government, pri-

9.
Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC v. Mivisair, 2019 BCSC 50, at ¶ 55
(citing Latimer, at ¶ 29) (emphasis added).
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vate industry, and citizens take these measures is a contingency that takes these consequences outside of “virtual
certainty” and into the realm of “foreseeable or likely.”10
Thus, the judge concluded that “a dire outcome” is not “virtually certain.”
The substance of our case is that any increase in the earth’s average surface temperature that exceeds 1.5°C will be a dire outcome—bringing devastating and irreversible impacts on human life and natural systems, impacts that are already far advanced. The losses will be
catastrophic as the warming of the earth approaches and exceeds 2°C. Our
proposed evidence shows that, at present, we are on a path to more than
3°C. The annual level of global emissions is still increasing.
A contingency, if it is very slight (like the contingency we have of
winning the lottery), cannot be material in deciding in this case that the
climate peril can be avoided. The judge made no finding about the degree
of likelihood that the hoped-for contingency will occur. The judge erred
in drawing an inference, unsupported by evidentiary material, that such a
“contingency” exists. That is our submission on this appeal.

V. REVIEW PROCESSES
The core question underlying this case is whether the planned expansion of Canada’s oil sands production to 2040 is compatible with our
commitment under the Paris Agreement to limit the increase in global average temperature to “well below 2°C” and make our best efforts to limit
the increase to 1.5°C. We can measure the integrity and strength of our
legal culture by examining how the approval process for the Trans Mountain project dealt with that question.
Three years ago, Canada authorized the construction of this project. The order that lies at the root of that decision is an Order in Council
dated November 29, 2016.11 The Trans Mountain project—together with
a second new project called Line 3—will provide 50% of the additional
pipeline capacity needed to drive the continued growth of Canada’s oil
sands production to 2040.
The Order in Council stated that the Government of Canada was
“satisfied” that this pipeline expansion project is “consistent with Canada’s commitments in relation to the Paris Agreement on Climate

10.
Id. (emphasis added).
11.
Order in Council P.C. 2016-1069, NAT. ENERGY BD. ACT (Nov. 29,
2016), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2016/2016-12-10/html/sup1-eng.html.
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Change.”12 That is obviously a crucial statement. The Order provided the
ethical foundation, not just the legal foundation, for the pipeline approval
decision. In authorizing Trans Mountain, the Order cited three reports
that, it declared, had furnished the evidence relied on by the cabinet to
justify their decision.
A. National Energy Board Inquiry Report (May 19, 2016)
On May 19, 2016, the National Energy Board (“NEB”) issued a
report recommending approval of the Trans Mountain project, following
a lengthy inquiry through 2014 and 2015.13 It was a public hearing process, and it had full powers to call evidence. However, the NEB took the
view that “upstream emissions” released into the atmosphere at oil sands
production sites in Alberta did not fall within the scope of the inquiry. The
inquiry excluded all evidence about greenhouse gas emissions in Alberta—and excluded all scientific evidence about the impact of emissions
on the climate system.
Two years earlier, on April 2, 2014, when it issued the Hearing
Order for the Project which included the List of Issues, the NEB excluded
from the List of Issues the environmental effects associated with upstream
activities and development of the oil sands, including GHG emissions.
The City of Vancouver at that time applied for an order expanding the List
to include those issues.
The NEB panel in a ruling on July 23, 2014 (NEB Ruling 25) rejected the application by the City of Vancouver to expand the List of Issues, which would have permitted intervenors to call expert evidence
about emissions and climate change.14 The substance of the ruling was
that environmental impacts of that kind are not “directly related” to the

12.
13.

Id. (emphasis added).
NEB Report on Trans Mountain Expansion Project, OH-001-2014,
NAT. ENERGY BD. (May 19, 2016) (Doc. No. A77045-1), https://docs2.cerrec.gc.ca/ll-eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90464/90552/548311/956726/2392873/2969696/2969867/A77045
%2D1_NEB_%2D_Report_%2D_Trans_Mountain_%2D__Expansion_Project_%2D_OH%2D001%2D2014.pdf?nodeid=2969681&vernum=-2.
14.
Ruling No. 25 on Trans Mountain Expansion Project, OH-001-2014,
NAT. ENERGY BD. at 3 (July 23, 2014) (Doc. No. A63-1), https://docs2.cerrec.gc.ca/ll-eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90464/90552/548311/956726/2392873/2449981/2487600/A63%2
D1_%2D_Ruling_No._25_%2D_A3Z5I4.pdf?nodeid=2487522&vernum=-2 (emphasis added).
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Project: “The Project does not include upstream production and is not dependent on any particular upstream development and, therefore, any link
to environmental changes caused by such upstream production is indirect
and not necessarily incidental to Project approval.”15
On October 16, 2014, the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) dismissed an application by the City of Vancouver for leave to appeal NEB
Ruling 25.16 Other parties also challenged the exclusion of climate evidence. All lawful avenues to raise questions concerning the emissions and
climate implications of the proposed Trans Mountain expansion project by
participating in the NEB inquiry process were effectively closed by reason
of the above rulings and orders. When the NEB recommended approval
of the project on May 19, 2016, the report did not discuss emissions or
climate.
B. Trans Mountain Upstream Emissions Report (November 25, 2016)
The second review process was the so-called “upstream emissions assessment” for the Trans Mountain project, officially called the
“Review of Related Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates for the Trans
Mountain Expansion Project.”17 The purpose of the assessment was
briefly described in a January 2016 announcement: “Assess the upstream
greenhouse gas emissions associated with this project and make this information public.”18 On March 19, 2016, the government quietly published details of the emissions assessment procedure in the Canada Gazette explaining the new procedure.19
The final upstream emissions report, publicly released on November 25, 2016, ultimately acknowledged that the annual level of oil sands
emissions will rise from 90 Mt in 2020 to 116 Mt by 2030, and accepted
that the expanded capacity of the Trans Mountain project will account for

15.
Id. (emphasis added).
16.
Order Dismissing City of Vancouver Leave to Appeal Ruling No. 25,
(F.C.A. Oct. 16, 2014) (No. 14-A-55).
17.
Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC – Trans Mountain Expansion Project
Review of Related Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates, ENV’T & CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/documents/p80061/116524E.pdf.
18.
Interim Measures for Pipeline Reviews, GOV’T OF CAN. (Jan. 27,
2016),
https://www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2016/01/interimmeasures-for-pipeline-reviews.html.
19.
Dep’t of Env’t & Climate Change, Estimating Upstream GHG Emissions, 150 CAN. GAZETTE 786, 787 (Mar. 19, 2016), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rppr/p1/2016/2016-03-19/pdf/g1-15012.pdf.
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13 Mt to 15 Mt of that growth. Yet the report stated, in its conclusions,
that assuming long-term oil prices reach US$80 or higher in the post-2020
period, any “incremental GHG emissions” attributed to the pipeline expansion will be “minimal.” That optimistic conclusion was incorporated
into the language of the formal Order in Council dated November 29,
2016, which authorized the construction of the Trans Mountain project.
The Order recited a brief summary of the upstream assessment report regarding the impact of the pipeline on Canada’s total emissions: “The assessment concluded that incremental emissions are unlikely to be expected
as oil production is expected to grow by more than the capacity of the
expanded line regardless of whether the pipeline is built.”20
This appeared to be an assurance that the Trans Mountain pipeline
expansion would not cause higher emissions. That seemingly contradictory finding is explained by the methodology that governed the upstream
emissions assessment. The methodology was prescribed in the five-page
notice published in the Canada Gazette on March 19, 2016:
The assessment of upstream GHG’s will consist of two
parts: (A) a quantitative estimation of the GHG emissions
released as a result of upstream production associated
with the project, and (B) a discussion of the project’s potential impact on Canadian and global GHG emissions.21
The document described the procedure as “the methodology.”
The first step was to calculate the “estimated throughput” (i.e., how much
diluted bitumen would be carried by the project). Part A of the assessment
would calculate the total GHG emissions “associated with the project”—
i.e., the volume of emissions generated every year in the course of producing the amount of bitumen that could be transported to markets by the new
pipeline, if it were built. Part B of the assessment promised to provide
Canadians with “a discussion of the project’s potential impact on Canadian
and global emissions.” But the “methodology” designed for Part B of the
assessment was formulated in a particular way, which fatally limited the

20.
Explanatory Note, Order in Council P.C. 2016-1069, NAT. ENERGY
BD. (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2016/2016-12-10/html/sup1eng.html (emphasis added).
21.
Dep’t of Env’t & Climate Change, Estimating upstream GHG emissions, 150 CAN. GAZETTE 786, 787 (Mar. 19, 2016), http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rppr/p1/2016/2016-03-19/pdf/g1-15012.pdf (emphasis added).
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scope of the inquiry: “The second part of the analysis discusses the conditions under which the Canadian upstream emissions estimated in Part A
could be expected to occur even if the project were not built.”22
The above wording meant that in looking at the impact of “the
Project,” the assessment must ask this question: Will future increase in oil
sands production (and therefore the future increase of emissions) made
possible by the additional transport capacity of this project occur even if
the pipeline is not built? Clear guidance is given on what steps the assessment must follow to answer that question: “The second step involves evaluating the technical and economic potential for alternate modes of transportation to be used in the absence of the proposed project.”23
Rail transport is of course the alternative. The assessment is therefore required to evaluate whether rail transport would be an economically
viable method to transport the increased bitumen production to market and
must look at the “economic and technical potential” of the alternate mode
of transport. Rail transport is more expensive than pipelines (about US$10
more per barrel, according to the assessment). The crucial question was
whether long-term oil prices will be high enough to cover the extra cost of
rail “in the absence of the proposed project.” The Trans Mountain report
accepted evidence that oil prices at about $80 per barrel or higher would
make rail transport viable.
The March 18, 2016 notice stipulated how the assessment
should proceed:
As an example, when considering whether Canadian
GHG emissions would increase as a result of a crude oil
pipeline project, the primary factor will be the potential
increase in Canadian upstream oil production that would
be expected to occur if the [pipeline] were not built.24
Therefore, if rail transport is an economically viable alternative,
then the assessment was obliged to decide that the increased production
that will be carried in the proposed pipeline would be produced anyway,
even if the pipeline were not built. In that case, the new pipeline would
not make emissions any worse—because the increased production would
still occur even if the new pipeline were not approved. In that case, the
pipeline will not “cause” any “incremental” emissions, according to the
terminology.

22.
23.
24.

Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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Of course, in reality, emissions will increase if production grows.
The assessment found that the amount of increased bitumen production
carried by expanded pipeline capacity would account for an additional 13
Mt to 15 Mt of greenhouse gas emissions per year (about a 20% increase
of the industry’s total emissions, based on the 2015 level)—a significant
increase in our total emissions.
Guided by the prescribed methodology, the Trans Mountain assessment was able to show that “incremental” emissions caused by the
pipeline expansion will be “minimal.”25 Evidence was available to establish that long-term oil prices will increase to about US$78 per barrel by
2020 and will continue to rise gradually to US$102 by 2040. The assessment concluded the project would cause only minimal “incremental”
emissions, because the same amount of production increase (and the same
emissions growth) would occur if the pipeline were not built—because rail
transport would be viable as an alternate form of transport.
In truth, the accumulating concentration of CO2 emissions in the
atmosphere is the problem we are trying to solve. In light of that problem,
the distinction between pipelines and rail transport is meaningless. If we
increase production by 590,000 barrels per day (the increased capacity
added by the Trans Mountain expansion), Canada’s total emissions will
increase by 13 Mt to 15 Mt—whether the increased output is shipped by
pipeline or shipped by rail.
The upstream emissions assessment was a closed process. It was
not a public inquiry. There were no hearings. There was no media access.
The government and the pipeline company controlled the flow of information. Incredibly, the procedure required that only “publicly available
data provided by the proponent will be used.” The “proponent” was the
pipeline company. No representatives of the public could participate or
demand the right to call evidence.
In this hugely consequential decision, everything depended on the
integrity of the second process, the upstream emission assessment. A
proper inquiry must be public, because that is our guarantee that the evidence will not be pre-selected or cherry-picked. The integrity of the process must be protected by the basic principles of judicial independence, so
we can be confident that decision makers are not being influenced by pressures, discussions, or other sources of information that have not been

25.
Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC—Trans Mountain Expansion Project
Review of Related Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions Estimates, ENV’T & CLIMATE CHANGE CAN. 39 tbl. 7 (Nov. 15, 2016), https://iaac-aeic.gc.ca/050/documents/p80061/116524E.pdf
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tested in the hearing room, in public view. The assessment failed to meet
any of these basic standards, quietly deciding behind closed doors what
evidence it would look at, and what lines of inquiry it would ignore.
C. The Ministerial Panel on the Trans Mountain Pipeline
(November 1, 2016)
There was a third process. The Ministerial Panel was an unusual
kind of public consultation, appointed by the Federal Minister of Natural
Resources in May 2016. It did not have any powers to call evidence, or to
make findings, or draw conclusions. The Ministerial Panel’s only mandate
was to listen to members of the public—including some of Canada’s leading experts on emissions who volunteered to make submissions. People
were permitted to attend a series of public meetings in Alberta and British
Columbia to express their concerns about what issues and evidence had
been overlooked, or inadequately dealt with, during the previous two processes.
Where it was faced with conflicting information or contradictory
opinions, the panel was not permitted to adjudicate which view should be
accepted. All it could do was report the conflicting information to the
Minister in Ottawa. After two months of public meetings, the panel released its report on November 1, 2016.
One of the most significant divergences the Ministerial Panel
identified in its report was a fundamental difference between two visions
about the future trend of global oil demand. The panel summarized the
views of presenters in Alberta (people who attended and made submissions to the panel were called “presenters”; this was not a judicial hearing).
The panel recounts the submissions during the hearings in Alberta about
the future of global oil demand:
There was no campaign of denial. At the same time, presenters pointed to domestic and international energy industry projections that show a rising need for hydrocarbon-based sources during a period of transition to
renewable forms of energy. The question, they said, is
not whether Canada, and the world, should be shifting to
clean energy; rather, it’s a matter of how quickly that conversion can occur. The presenters who appeared before
us in Calgary suggested a transitional timeline in the order
of 30 to 50 years. And if you accept that timeline as realistic, they said that Canada should be prepared in the
meantime to compete . . . for international market share;
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Canada should not restrain its energy production at the
expense of the country’s economic potential or living
standard . . . .26
In direct contradiction to that view, the report quotes several leading climate researchers who, in their submissions to the panel, explained the consequences of allowing Canadian oil and gas production to grow as presently planned. They explained that our present energy resource expansion
plans are incompatible with our overriding commitment to keep warming
below 2°C. The panel quotes political scientist Kathryn Harrison, who has
researched and published widely on energy policy and the efficacy of Canada’s emissions reduction efforts: “To embrace the economic viability of
this project is to self-consciously make an economic bet on a world of
catastrophic climate change that the Government of Canada itself explicitly committed to avoid.”27 Harrison’s point is that the future economic
viability of the Trans Mountain project depends on the world experiencing
continued growth of global oil demand over the next 25 years to 2040.
Canada’s oil sands industry is a high-cost producer, compared to other
major suppliers of conventional crude oil around the world. The industry
requires relatively high long-term oil prices to cover its comparatively
high production costs. The NEB’s forecast expansion of oil sands production from 2.3 million barrels per day (“bpd”) in 2014 to 4.3 million bpd in
2040—which is the economic rationale for the Trans Mountain project—
is based on the assumption that we will see two or three more decades of
increasing global oil consumption.
But continued growth of global oil consumption for 25 more years
is incompatible with keeping warming within the 2°C limit. In a 2015 report, Kathryn Harrison explained her analysis:
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has modeled national and global emissions consistent with limiting climate change to the internationally agreed target of 2C,
which would entail peaking CO2 concentration in the atmosphere at 450ppm. Underscoring the potential impacts
of international action on Canada’s exports, this “450

26.
Ministerial Panel, Report from the Ministerial Panel for the Trans
Mountain Expansion Project, NAT. RES. CAN. 10 (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/files/pdf/16011_TMX%20Full%20Report-en_nov2-11-30am.pdf (emphasis added).
27.
Id. at 32 (quoting Kathryn Harrison, Professor of Political Science
at The Univ. of B.C.).
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ppm scenario” finds that global oil consumption would
need to peak as early as 2020 and decline thereafter, with
projected demand in 2035 13% lower than in 2011.28
Harrison warned that a “transitional period” of rising oil demand for another 30 years is “an economic bet on a world of catastrophic climate
change.”29 U.B.C. climate scientist Simon Donner, in his submission to
the Ministerial Panel, addressed the same concern. He focused on the assumption (accepted by the Trans Mountain report) that global oil production will continue to increase up to 2040. He specifically criticized the
conclusion in the Trans Mountain report that even if Canada were to curb
the expansion of its oil sands production, “investments would be made in
other jurisdictions and global oil consumption would be materially unchanged in the long term . . . .”30 I quote here the Ministerial Panel’s
summary of Simon Donner’s answer: “Donner described this as typical of
the tragedy-of-the-commons analysis in which, if everyone in the world
decides that the impact of their contribution is irrelevant in a global context, then everyone will continue to expand.”31
If all of the world’s major oil producing countries that have large
enough oil reserves to substantially increase their production levels during
the next 25 years decide to do so (there are about six big producers, including Canada, that have the capability to do that), the world will have
no chance of keeping the increase in global temperature below the 2°C
threshold.
Unfortunately, the Ministerial Panel had no power to make findings of fact or to draw any conclusions based on scientific evidence. It
had no authority to adjudicate between the views of the Alberta presenters
(that we can safely keep increasing global oil consumption for another 30
to 50 years) and the evidence of climate scientists (that further growth of
global oil production must begin to decline after 2020).

28.
Kathryn Harrison, Review of Destination Country Policies with Potential to Impact Demand for Canadian Oil Exports, CITY OF VANCOUVER 8 (May
2015), https://vancouver.ca/images/web/pipeline/Kathryn-Harrison-impact-of-destination-country-policies-on-oil-exports.pdf (emphasis added).
29.
Ministerial Panel, Report from the Ministerial Panel for the Trans
Mountain Expansion Project, NAT. RES. CAN. 32 (Nov. 1, 2016),
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/files/pdf/16011_TMX%20Full%20Report-en_nov2-11-30am.pdf (emphasis added) (quoting
Kathryn Harrison, Professor of Political Science, Univ. of B.C.).
30.
Id. at 32–33.
31.
Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
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The panel was not allowed to make “recommendations.” But it
found a way to make what were, in effect, a series of highly significant
findings—findings that identify crucial questions that had not been answered. The panel stated: “Our role was not to propose solutions, but to
identify important questions that, in the circumstances, remain unanswered.”32
The first “high-level question” that “remains unanswered,” according to the three panel members, is whether the growth of emissions
that will result from building the Trans Mountain pipeline can be reconciled with Canada’s climate change commitment, which includes our 2030
emissions reduction target. The panel states the question this way: “Can
construction of a new Trans Mountain Pipeline be reconciled with Canada’s climate change commitments?”33 The panel unanimously concluded
that this is one of the important questions that “remain unanswered.” The
Ministerial Panel’s report was delivered to the government on November
1, 2016. Four weeks later, the cabinet announced its decision approving
the two pipelines—without any public comment on the unanswered question.
The panel was correct. The question—about whether Canada’s
projected expansion of oil sands production to 2040 can be reconciled with
a 2°C world—had never been answered. The NEB inquiry refused to accept or consider any evidence about the impact of increasing oil sands
emissions on the climate system. The upstream emissions assessment had
accepted without question (and without cross-examination or scrutiny)
that Canada’s oil sands production would continue to expand up to 2040
in accord with the NEB’s “business-as-usual” projection.
None of these three processes offered any findings that could have
“satisfied” the cabinet that the Trans Mountain project was “consistent”
with our climate commitments.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Order in Council had all the outer markings of a lawful order.
But the Order was not derived from any process of inquiry that would allow us to trust the decision. The Order in Council, therefore, cannot compel our respect. In answer to our application to call evidence about the
emissions implications of the Trans Mountain expansion and climate
change, the Crown Prosecutor told the court at our hearing that there is “no

32.
33.

Id. at 46.
Id.
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need to delve into climate change.” The core problem is that the Federal
Government refused to delve into climate change—and then deceived Canadians by claiming that it had done so, even incorporating that misleading
claim into the text of the Order itself. Canada’s political institutions have
failed us at this horrific moment, tainting the lawful roots of this project,
which rests on the Order in Council and the woefully inadequate review
processes that preceded it. Our own government cast off the prudent and
cautious law-sanctioned rules that would have allowed us to have confidence in their findings and decisions. We are forced, in forbidding circumstances, to make our own judgments about the risks ahead.

